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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Summary Of Dispute.
Following the entry of judgment in favor of Bums Holdings, LLC and Bums Concrete,

Inc. (jointly, "Bums") on a claim against Teton County for breach of contract, Bums filed an
application requesting the attorney fees incurred through the date of filing and was awarded fees
in the amount of $792,529.25 for both the attorney fees billed by, and the additional contingency
fees owed to, Bums' attorneys, but with the district court disallowing without explanation
$278,576.48 in additional requested fees.

Bums then filed a motion for reconsideration and

requested the supplemental attorney fees Bums incurred since filing its initial application and
was awarded the full amount billed by Bums' attorneys, but with the district court disallowing
without explanation $72,349.00 in requested supplemental contingency fees Bums owes its
attorneys out of the amount recovered from Teton County.
In this third appeal of this case, Teton County contests the award of all contingency fees
Bums owes its attorneys and Bums contests the district court's disallowance without explanation
of the $278,576.48 and $72,349.00 amounts included in Bums' initial and supplemental fee
applications.

B.

Course Of Proceedings.
Bums filed its verified complaint initiating this civil action on May 21, 2013

("Complaint"). [Clerk's Record filed January 29, 2020 ("R"), p. 25.] After Teton County filed
its verified answer and counterclaim on June 11, 2013 ("Answer" or "Counterclaim," as
applicable) [R, p. 49], Bums filed its initial reply to the claims made against it on July 5, 2013
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[R, p. 6], and then after obtaining the district court's leave to amend its reply [R, p. 9], filed an

amended reply to Teton County's Counterclaim on December 29, 2014 [R, p. 9].
Both Bums and Teton County moved for the entry of summary judgment, with Bums
moving for the entry of partial summary judgment in its favor on the liability issues only on
August 11, 2014 [R, p. 7], and Teton County moving for full summary judgment in its favor on
both counts of its Counterclaim on September 18, 2014 [R, p. 8]. The district court denied
Bums' motion and granted Teton County's by the court's Memorandum Decision and Order Re:
Motions for Summary Judgment, filed December 19, 2014. [R, p. 9.] The district court's first
"final" judgment was filed on July 13, 2015 [R, p. 10], with respect to which Bums filed its
notice of appeal on August 21, 2015 [R, p. 1OJ.
By its opinion in Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County, 161 Idaho 117, 121, 384 P.3d
364, 368 (2016) ("Burns Concrete I"), the Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Teton County and vacated the judgment. The case was thereafter remitted
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion in Burns Concrete I. [R,
p. 11.]

On December 30, 2016, Bums renewed its previously denied motion for partial summary
judgment seeking, inter alia, judgment on the liability component of Bums' claim for breach of
contract and rescission. [R, p. 11.] The motion was briefed by the parties and then heard by the
district court on April 10, 2017, following which the district court entered its May 2, 2017, order
granting Bums partial summary judgment on the liability issue only of its claim for breach of
contract and on rescission of the parties' agreement. [R, p. 12.]
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Teton County moved the district court on January 3, 2018, to reconsider its order granting
Bums partial summary judgment. [R, p. 15.] Following the hearing of the motion on January
17, 2018 [R, p. 16], the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to
Reconsider and Motion in Limine, filed February 12, 2018 [R, pp. 91-115], by which
reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment on Bums' claim for breach of contract was
denied but reconsideration of the order granting rescission of the parties' agreement was granted
[R, p. 114].

A bench trial to establish the amount of Bums' recoverable damages was held March 7-9,
2018, and then continued to and completed on May 11, 2018. [R, p. 19.]
Following preparation of the trial transcript by the court reporter and both parties then
filing their respective proposed findings and conclusions and responses to the other party's
filings, the district court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 4, 2018
[R, p. 19]. Bums then filed a motion for amended and additional findings and conclusions on

October 25, 2018. [R, p. 19.] After the motion was briefed and heard by the district court on
December 19, 2018, the court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for
Amended and Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed January 18, 2019 [R,
pp. 116-39], by which the district court made some additional findings of fact but denied Bums'
request for reconsideration of the court's denial of rescission of the parties' agreement or of the
other issues raised by Bums [R, pp. 137-38].
The district court's second "final" judgment was thereafter filed on February 28, 2019
("Judgment"). [R, pp. 140-42.] On the same day Teton County filed its Notice of Appeal [R, p.
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21], followed later by both an amended notice and then a second amended notice. Bums filed its
Notice of Cross-Appeal on April 9, 2019 [R, p. 21], and the appeal of the Judgment remains
pending before the Supreme Court (Docket No. 46827-2019).
Following the district court's initial award to Bums of its costs and attorney fees on
September 9, 2019 [R, p. 22], Teton County filed its Notice of Appeal of the award on October
21, 2019 [R, p. 22]. Teton County did not, however, appeal the district court's subsequent order
filed December 17, 2019, reconsidering its initial award and awarding Bums supplemental
attorney fees. [R, p. 23.]
Bums filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal appealing both the initial award of attorney fees
and the subsequent supplemental award on January 7, 2020 [R, pp. 391-98], under and pursuant
to Rule 1 l(a)(7), Idaho Appellate Rules ("I.A.R."), with respect to an appeal of orders made after
final judgment and within the 42-day period prescribed by I.A.R. 14(a) and 15(b).

C.

Statement Of Facts ("SOF'').
1.

On March 11, 2019, within 14 days after entry of the Judgment, Bums filed its

Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs ("Fee Memorandum") [R, pp. 143-71], the Declaration
of Kirk Bums [R, pp. 172-94], and the Declaration of Robert B. Bums [R, pp. 195-341], by
which Bums requested and supported an award for the following attorney fees and costs:
Attorney Fees [R, p. 154]:
Attorney Fees Billed

$

557,080.96

Attorney Contingency Fees
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514,186.75

W estlaw Search Fees

486.02

Total Attorney Fees

$1,071,753.73

Costs [R, p. 158]:
Costs as a Matter of Right

$

Discretionary Costs

3,886.40
59,403.53

Total Costs

$

63,289.93

Bums' application for fees and costs was briefed by the parties [R, p. 21], with no request for
hearing being made by any of them, and then subsequently set for hearing and argued on August
23, 2019, at the direction of the district court [R, p. 22].
2.

Bums' request for an award of the contingency fees owed to its counsel, Parsons

Behle & Latimer ("Parsons Behle"), was supported by the following declaration testimony of
Kirk Bums:
4.
Plaintiffs had by the time of the trial in this dispute
incurred several millions of dollars in costs under the Agreement
and, because of this significant financial investment, were unable
to pay Parsons Behle on a reasonably current basis for the legal
fees required to prosecute this lawsuit to judgment and on the
inevitable appeal that would follow, together with any post-appeal
proceedings, without adversely impacting Plaintiffs' ongoing
business operations.
5.
Parsons Behle and Plaintiffs therefore negotiated a
new engagement agreement in July 2018 providing that Parsons
Behle would recover its unpaid attorney fees from Plaintiffs on a
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modified contingent-fee basis. A true and correct copy of the
modified engagement letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A. [I]
6.
Under this new engagement letter, Parsons Behle
and Plaintiffs agreed that Parsons Behle would continue to bill all
attorney fees at Parson Behle' s normal hourly rates, with those
costs (but not fees) previously or subsequently billed to Plaintiffs
for representation in this lawsuit being paid by Plaintiffs within 60
days from the respective invoice dates. However, all attorney fees
(but not costs) that were billed to Plaintiffs and not been [sic] paid
within 120 days from the respective invoice dates would be
converted to a contingent-fee basis, whereby three times (300%) of
the total amount of such fees would become payable to Parsons
Behle out of (and only out of) any damages that might be collected
from Teton County following the entry of a final judgment and the
resolution of all appeals. This modified contingent-fee agreement
allowed Parsons Behle to continue its representation of Plaintiffs in
the district court and the then-anticipated appeal, while preserving
Plaintiffs' right to pay Parsons Behle on a reasonably current basis
as much of the billed legal fees as Plaintiffs were able to pay in
order to minimize those fees that were converted to a contingentfee basis.
(Underscoring added) [R, pp. 173-74]. Teton County provided no rebuttal evidence to Kirk
Bums' foregoing declaration testimony.
3.

By its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Costs and Attorney Fees, filed

September 9, 2019 (the "Initial Award'') [R, pp. 342-65], the district court awarded Bums
$3,886.40 in costs as a matter of right, but no discretionary costs, and $792,529.25 in attorney
fees [R, p. 364].
4.

Bums then timely filed on September 18, 2019, its Motion to Reconsider and

Amend Award of Attorney Fees to Include Supplemental Fees to recover the additional attorney
1

A true and correct copy of the modified engagement letter is also attached to this brief
as Exhibit A (the "Fee Agreement"). [R, 176-80.]
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fees incurred since Bums filed its initial fee application on March 11 [R, p. 22], which was
supported by Bums' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider and Amend Award of
Attorney Fees to Include Supplemental Fees [ R, pp. 366-70] and the Second Declaration of
Robert B. Bums [R, pp. 371-83]. Bums requested and supported in its moving papers an award
for the following supplemental attorney fees:
Additional Attorney Fees Billed

$

72,349.00 [R, p. 373]

Additional Contingency Fees
Total Additional Attorney Fees

16,254.50 [R, p. 372]

$

88,603.50

Bums' supplemental fee application was briefed by the parties [R, pp. 22-23] and then decided
without oral argument [R, p. 385].
5.

On December 17, 2019, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and

Order Re: Motion to Reconsider and Amend Award of Attorney Fees to Include Supplemental
Fees (the "Supplemental Award''). [R, pp. 384-90.] In granting reconsideration the district court
awarded Bums $16,254.40 for the full amount of the supplemental attorney fees it was billed by
its attorneys [R, p. 385], but made no additional award for the $72,349.00 in requested
supplemental contingency fees Bums owes its attorneys out of the amount recovered from Teton
County [R, p. 389].
(i)

Prevailing Party - Claims, Decrees and Determinations.

6.

A true and correct copy of the pertinent Developer's Agreement for Bums

Holdings, LLC (the "Agreement") between Bums and Teton County is attached to the Complaint
as Exhibit 1. Complaint, 2 [R, p. 26]; Answer, 2 [R, p. 50].

-721813.001 \4836-7850-0279v2

7.

In addition to requesting an award for its costs and expenses, including attorney

fees, and "such other and additional relief as may be just and proper," Bums sought judgment in
the Complaint as follows:
1.
for a decree enjoining Teton County from rezoning
the Property for so long as Bums is not in material breach of the
Agreement;

2.
for a decree establishing that the 18-month period to
construct the Permanent Facility specified in the Agreement has
been and remains tolled;
3.
for a decree establishing Teton County's material
breach and Bums' rescission of the Agreement, together with an
award for all damages Bums has incurred;
4.
in the event the Agreement should be held to be
unenforceable, for an award of restitution damages; ....

Complaint 11 (Prayer) [R, p. 35].
8.

The Judgment grants Bums the following relief:
1.
Plaintiffs Bums Concrete, Inc. and Bums Holdings,
LLC are jointly awarded damages against Defendant Teton County
in the sum of One Million Forty-Nine Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty and 90/l00's Dollars ($1,049,250.90); and
2.
The running of the 18-month period provided in
Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Developer's Agreement for Bums
Holdings, LLC, recorded September 5, 2007 by the Teton County
Recorder as Instrument No. 191250 pertaining to the construction
of the Permanent Facility defined and described in such agreement
is tolled in accordance with the Supreme Court of Idaho's opinion
in Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County, 161 Idaho 117, 384 P.3d
364 (2016).

Judgment [R, pp. 140-41]. Thus, Bums obtained substantially all the affirmative relief sought in
the Complaint by (a) the tolling of the 18-month period provided in the Agreement for
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constructing Bums' permanent concrete batch plant, and (b) an award for the damages incurred
by Bums related to or arising out of the Agreement, with (c) Bums' alternative request for
restitution damages being inapplicable because the Agreement was not held to be void or
voidable by Teton County.
9.

In addition to requesting an award for its costs and expenses, including attorney

fees, and "such other and additional relief as is just and proper," Teton County sought judgment
in the Counterclaim as follows:
1.
For a decree stating that Bums is in material breach
of the Agreement;
2.
For a decree establishing that the 18 month period
to construct the Permanent Facility has not been tolled and that the
18 month period has expired;
3.
For a decree stating that the Agreement has not
been breached by Teton County and that Bums' has no right to
resc1ss10n;
4.
For a decree stating that if the Agreement is
rescinded than the zone change from C-3 to M-1 would also be
rescinded;
5.
For a decree stating that Teton County has the right,
by agreement and by law, to rezone the subject property;
6.
For a decree stating that the Temporary Facility has
been in violation of the Teton County zoning laws since March 1,
2009; ....

Counterclaim 14-15 (Prayer) [R, pp. 62-63]. Teton County obtained none of the affirmative
relief it sought other than the determination that Bums had no right to rescind the Agreement,
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which determination is subject to the pending appeal before the Supreme Court in Docket No.
46827-2019.
10.

After first discussing the applicable legal principles under Rule 54(d)(l)(B), Idaho

Rules of Civil Procedure ("I.R.C.P."), with respect to the determination of a prevailing party, the
district court determined that Bums prevailed for the following reasons:
Plaintiffs Verified Complaint alleged causes of action for
(1) declaratory relief, (2) breach of contract and rescission, and (3)
unjust enrichment. Teton County counterclaimed for (1) breach of
contract and (2) declaratory judgment.
Summary judgment was granted in favor of Plaintiffs on
their breach of contract claim. Following trial on the issue of
damages, this Court awarded Plaintiffs $1,049,250 for damages
sustained as a result of Teton County's breach of contract. The
claims for declaratory relief and unjust enrichment were not tried
by the parties, but this Court acknowledged that the effect of the
Supreme Court's holding on appeal of the initial summary
judgment was to toll the 18-month limitation on operation of the
temporary facility - a significant portion of the relief sought in
Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief. Teton County did not
prevail on either of its counterclaims.
Considering the final judgment in relation to the relief
sought by Plaintiffs and Teton County, this Court finds Plaintiffs
prevailed.
Initial Award 6-7 (underscoring added) (footnote omitted) [R, pp. 347-48].

11.

The district court ruled as follows in determining that Bums is entitled to recover

its reasonable attorney fees as the prevailing party:
Rule 54(e)(1) provides: "In any civil action the court may
award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l )(B), when
provided for by any statute or contract." I.R.C.P. 54.
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Paragraph 12(e) of the Agreement provides: "If any party
shall bring suit against the other party to enforce this agreement,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees
and costs." Agreement at 6.
Teton County's argument raised this same argument at [sic]
was addressed by this Court in Section V.A. of the FOFCOL
[Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law]. As set forth in the
FOFCOL, Teton County is liable to both Bums Holdings and
Bums Concrete under the terms of the Agreement and both
Plaintiffs are allowed to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs
pursuant to paragraph 12(e). assuming they are the prevailing
parties.
Initial Award 4-5 (underscoring added) [R, pp. 345-46].
12.

Teton County includes no argument or authority in its Appellant's Brief

supporting a contention that the district court erred in determining that Bums prevailed in this
case and is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees.
(ii)

I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)- Considerations, Relevant Facts and Determinations.

I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) sets forth 12 factors for a court to consider in determining the amount of
attorney fees to award. The facts presented by Bums and the district court's determinations with
respect to each of the 12 factors are summarized in tum.
(a)
13.

Re: the Initial Award.

Time and Labor Required.

Bums addressed the applicable time and labor

consideration at pages 5-6 of its Fee Memorandum.

[R, pp. 147-48.] The district court's

determination with respect to this consideration was as follows: "In general, time entries for
Plaintiffs' claimed attorney fees are commensurate with what this Court would expect
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considering the time and labor required in this case." Initial Award 16-17 (underscoring added)
[R, pp. 357-58].

14.

Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions. Bums addressed the considerations of

novelty and difficulty at page 6 of its Fee Memorandum.

[R, p. 148.] The district court's

determination with respect to these considerations was as follows: "The questions litigated in this
case were not particularly novel or difficult, but necessitated diligent research and effort as
shown in Plaintiffs' claimed fees." Initial Award 17 (underscoring added) [R, p. 358].
15.

Attorney Skill, Experience and Ability. Bums addressed the considerations of

attorney skill, experience, and ability at pages 6-7 of its Fee Memorandum. [R, pp. 148-49.] The
district court's determination with respect to these considerations was as follows: "Plaintiffs'
lead attorney, Robert Bums, as well as all other attorneys involved, displayed competence and
expertise in the relevant fields of law at all times throughout the duration of litigations." Initial
Award 17 (underscoring added) [R, p. 358].
16.

Prevailing Charges for Like Work.

Bums addressed the consideration of

prevailing charges at pages 7-8 of its Fee Memorandum. [R, pp. 149-50.] The district court's
determination with respect to this consideration was as follows: "[Attorney] Bums's (as well as
the other attorneys') rates are consistent with those this Court sees in similar matters. The fact
that this rate was adjusted up over time during the duration of this six-year plus case, is likewise
consistent with the general practice in the area." Initial Award 17-18 (underscoring added) [R,
pp. 358-59].

-1221813.001 \4836-7850-0279v2

17.

Fixed or Contingent Fee. Bums addressed the considerations establishing why its

modified contingency-fee agreement was reasonable when entered into at pages 8-9 of its Fee

Memorandum. [R, pp. 150-51.] The district court included an extensive discussion of the Fee
Agreement at pages 18-21 of the Initial Award when making the following determinations in
rejection of Teton County's objections:
Although Teton County classifies the contingency
arrangement as an excessive and usurious rate of interest, Rule 1.5
[of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct] does not require that
a contingency fee be expressed as a fixed percentage of the total
recovery. Neither are the fee agreements [sic] prohibited under
Rule 1.5(d) applicable to his case. While Teton County classifies
the fee agreement as a usurious rate of interest, Plaintiffs would not
incur any liability on the 120-day past due fees if it did not prevail
and recover fees against Teton County. This contingency fee
arrangement is not strictly based on a rate of interest, usurious or
otherwise.
Teton also objects to the timing of the contingency fee
agreement because it was executed after trial in this matter. This
Court finds nothing suspicious or untoward pertaining to the
timing. Litigation in this case was protracted. The fact that
Plaintiffs reached a point at which they were no longer able to
make timely payment to counsel is not unusual or surprising.
Plaintiffs were well invested in the litigation's outcome by July
2018, two months after trial concluded. Reaching a contingency
agreement with Parsons Behle may well have been essential to
continuing its ultimately successful pursuit of relief. This Court
does not find the nature of the contingency fee arrangement
reached between Plaintiffs and counsel to be unreasonable in light
of the nature and duration of the litigation in this case.

Initial Award 20-21 (underscoring added) [R, pp. 361-62].
18.

Time Limitations.

Bums acknowledged that there were no time limitations

imposed that would affect the award of attorney fees. Fee Memorandum 9 [R, p. 151]. And the
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district court concurred in making the following determination: "Although no strict time
limitation was in place in this action, ... both parties attempted to expeditiously resolve the
case." Initial Award 21 (underscoring added) [R, p. 362].
19.

Amount Involved and Results Obtained. Bums addressed the consideration of the

amount involved and results obtained at pages 9-10 of its Fee Memorandum. [R, pp. 151-52.]
The district court's determination with respect to this consideration was as follows:
Plaintiffs sought approximately $1.9 million in reliance
damages, plus prejudgment interest. This Court granted judgment
in favor of Plaintiffs in the amount of $1,049,250.90 and denied
Plaintiffs' claim to prejudgment interest.

***
This Court is unpersuaded that Plaintiffs' fees should be
apportioned in accordance with the amount of damages they
recovered, as compared to those sought. Plaintiffs' recovery in this
case was substantial. Plaintiffs were required to strenuously
prosecute their action in order to recover damages against Teton
County. Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable award of attorney
fees without apportionment.
Initial Award 21-22 (underscoring added) [R, pp. 362-63].

20.

Undesirability of Case.

Both Bums and the district court concurred that the

"undesirability" factor is not here applicable. Fee Memorandum 10 [R, p. 152]; Initial Award 22
[R, p. 363].

21.

Nature and Length of Professional Relationship.

Both Bums and the district

court also concurred that the "relationship" factor is not here applicable. Fee Memorandum 10
[R, p. 152]; Initial Award 22 [R, p. 363].
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22.

Awards in Similar Cases. Bums addressed the consideration of awards in similar

cases at pages 10-11 of its Fee Memorandum.

[R, pp. 152-53].

The district court's

determination with respect to this consideration was as follows: "The fees sought in this action
are similar to those awarded in civil cases in southeast Idaho, requiring a similar investment of
time and effort on counsel's part." Initial Award 22 (underscoring added) [R, p. 363].
23.

Cost of Automated Research. Both Bums and the district court also concurred

that the minor amount charged for Westlaw ($486.02) was reasonable. Fee Memorandum 11 [R,
p. 153]; Initial Award 22-23 [R, pp. 363-64].
24.

Other Factors. Finally, the district court did "not find any other particular factor

relevant to consideration of fees in this case." Initial Award 23 [R, p. 364].
25.

Teton County includes no argument or authority in its Appellant's Brief

supporting a contention that the district court erred in its foregoing determinations other than
with respect to the court's determinations concerning Bums' Fee Agreement with counsel.
26.

Notwithstanding the district court's foregoing determinations with respect to the

12 factors to be considered under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) - each of which was found to support Bums'
requested fee award or to be inapplicable to the award - the district court reduced the amount
awarded for Bums' initial fee application based on the court's following conclusion:
"Considering all of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, this Court finds attorney fees totaling $792,529.25
to be reasonable given the facts, circumstances, and proceedings in this case." Initial Award 23
[R, p. 364].
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27.

However, out of Bums' initial fee application of $1,071,753.73, the district court

specifically disallowed only $648.00 of what the court labeled "transactional fees" at page 15 of
the Initial Award [R, p. 356] - which disallowance is not contested by Bums - with the district
court providing no explanation for its disallowance of an additional $278,576.48 from what the
court otherwise determined to be reasonable attorney fees - which disallowance is contested by
Bums.
(b)

28.

Re: the Supplemental Award.

In determining Bums' motion for reconsideration and award of the supplemental

attorney fees Bums incurred after filing its initial application for fees and costs, the district court
ruled as follows:
In its previous decision, this Court engaged in a thorough
analysis of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, as applied to Plaintiffs'
requested fees. Although Teton County reasserts objections to
Plaintiffs' request for fees, it does not raise any new issues not
previously addressed by this Court in its September 9, 2019,
Memorandum Decision and Order. This Court reconsiders and
reaffirms the analysis set forth in that previous Order. That
analysis is equally applicable to and included in the Court's
consideration of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors at this time. Considering
all of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, this Court finds the $16,254.50 in
attorney fees set forth in Exhibit A to Robert B. Bums's Second
Declaration to be reasonable for attorney fees billed and/or
incurred subsequent to the March 11, 2019, Memorandum of
Attorney Fees and Costs. This Court, therefore, awards Plaintiffs
an additional $16,254.50 in reasonable attorney fees.
Supplemental Award 6 (underscoring added) [R, p. 389].

29.

Teton County also includes no argument or authority in its Appellant's Brief

supporting a contention that the district court erred in its foregoing determinations.
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30.

Although the district court granted Bums the full amount of the supplemental

attorney fees it was billed by its attorneys, the district court provided no explanation for
disallowing all of the $72,349.00 in requested supplemental contingency fees Bums owes its
attorneys out of the amount recovered from Teton County - which disallowance is also contested
by Bums.
II.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the district court abuse its discretion in reducing Bums' initial application for

attorney fees by $278,576.48 without articulating those factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), or
any other factor the court deemed appropriate, that support the reduction?
B.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in reducing Bums' supplemental

application for attorney fees by the $72,349.00 in additional contingency fees Bums owes its
attorneys without articulating those factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), or any other factor the
court deemed appropriate, that support the reduction, nor explaining why the terms of Bums'
contingency-fee agreement with its counsel were reasonable and applicable to Bums' initial fee
application but not to its supplemental fee application?
C.

Is Bums entitled to recover the reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal

pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and Paragraph 12.e of the Agreement?
III.

STANDARDS FOR REVIEW

The standards for reviewing an appeal from an award of attorney fees are set forth in
H20 Environmental, Inc. v. Farm Supply Distributors, Inc., 164 Idaho 295, 299-300, 429 P.3d
183, 187-88 (2018), as follows:
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"When awarding attorney's fees, a [trial] court must consider the
applicable factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and may consider
any other factor that the court deems appropriate." Johannsen v.
Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 432, 196 P.3d 341, 350 (2008) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 10-11, 189 P.3d
467, 472-73 (2008)). "Though it is not necessary for the court to
address all of the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors in writing, the record
must clearly indicate the court considered all of the factors." Id. at
432-33, 196 P.3d at 350-51. "[A]lthough the time and labor
actually expended by an attorney is to be considered, it is also to be
evaluated under a standard of reasonableness." Med. Recovery
Servs., LLC v. Jones, 145 Idaho 106, 110, 175 P.3d 795, 799 (Ct.
App. 2007).
[W]hen this court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial
court, it determines if the lower court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of
its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,864,421 P.3d 187, 195 (2018).
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Rebuttal Of Points And Authorities Raised In Teton County's Appeal.

As noted above, Teton County provides no argument or authority in its Appellant's Brief
supporting a contention that the district court erred in determining that Bums prevailed and is
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees or in determining any of the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)
factors other than with respect to the determinations concerning Bums' modified contingencyfee agreement. Accordingly, Teton County's appeal is limited to its challenges to Bums' Fee
Agreement with counsel. Eldridge v. West, No. 45214, 2020 WL 770347, at *9 (Idaho Feb. 18,
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2020) ("This Court will not consider an issue not 'supported by argument and authority in the
opening brief."' (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).
Teton County makes the following challenges to the Fee Agreement:
•

that the Fee Agreement is unreasonable;

•

that the Fee Agreement provides for a fixed fee with a usurious rate of interest;

•

that the Fee Agreement violates the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct ("I.R.P.C.")
because Bums' counsel obtained an interest in Bums' cause of action by the Fee
Agreement and it does not qualify as a contingency-fee agreement; and

•

that the Fee Agreement seeks to supersede the statutory interest rate on judgments
provided under Idaho law.

Each of these arguments is addressed in tum.
1.

The Fee Agreement Is Reasonable in Light of the Nature and Duration of
this Case.

The reasons establishing why the Fee Agreement was reasonable from Bums' perspective
are set forth in Kirk Bums' declaration and quoted above in SOF ,r 2. The district court ruled in
accepting these reasons that the Fee Agreement was not "unreasonable in light of the nature and
duration of the litigation in this case." SOF ,r 17. Other than as discussed and rebutted in the
following parts of this brief, Teton County provides no explanation for how the district court
abused its discretion in finding that the Fee Agreement was reasonable.
Moreover, in addressing and rejecting most of the arguments now raised by Teton County
in its appeal and rebutted below by Bums, the district court quoted and adopted the Supreme
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Court's explanation in Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Company, 143 Idaho 743, 748,
152 P.3d 614, 619 (2007), articulating why a contingent fee for more than the amount payable on
an hourly basis may be reasonable:
[S]ometimes under a contingent fee agreement an attorney will
recover more than he or she would under an hourly fee, and
sometimes the attorney will recover less or nothing at all.
Likewise, the attorney's client will sometimes pay more than he or
she would have paid under an hourly fee agreement, and the client
will at other times pay less or nothing at all for the legal services
rendered. A contingent fee agreement that was reasonable when
entered into does not become unreasonable simply because in the
end the attorney recovers more than he or she would have under an
hourly fee contract.
Initial Award 19-20 (underscoring added) [R, pp. 360-61].
2.

The Fee Agreement Provides for Neither a Fixed Fee nor Usurious Interest.

Teton County argues that the Fee Agreement provides for a fixed fee with a usurious rate
of interest. But as discussed above in SOF ,r 2, the Fee Agreement provides that all attorney fees
that were billed to Bums and not paid within 120 days from their respective invoice dates would
convert to a contingent-fee basis, whereby three times (i.e., 300%) of the total amount of such
fees would be payable to Parsons Behle out of (and only out of) any damages that might be
collected from Teton County following the entry of a final judgment and the resolution of all

appeals.
Thus, because the relevant terms provide for the payment of the contingency fees solely
out of any damages recovered from Teton County, the Fee Agreement does not provide for the
payment of a fixed fee, as nothing would be payable by Bums in the absence of a recovery from
Teton County and then only in an amount not exceeding the recovery. And because the relevant
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terms provide for the payment of a fixed 300% of the attorney fees outstanding for more than
120 days without regard to how long they remain unsatisfied - whether it be four months or four
years or more - the Fee Agreement does not provide for the payment of any interest at all. Cf
Credit Suisse AG v. Teufel Nursery, Inc., 156 Idaho 189, 201, 321 P.3d 739, 751 (2014)

(affirming the district court's ruling that the purpose of prejudgment interest is to compensate for
the time value of money)). Moreover, because Idaho's former usury law, Idaho Code§§ 28-222

107, was repealed in 1983, Teton County's usury defense is meritless on its face. See, e.g., 44B
AM. JuR. 2D Interest and Usury § 3 (2017) ("In the absence of statute, any rate of interest agreed
upon by the parties is legal"). Indeed, the sole authority cited by Teton County in support of this
defense decided the application of Idaho's long-since repealed usury statute to the facts then
before the court. See Rangen, Inc. v. Valley Trout Farms, Inc., 104 Idaho 284, 286, 658 P.2d
955, 957 (1983) ("Usury is '[t]he taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate of interest
greater than is allowed by this chapter when knowingly done.' I.C. § 28-22-107 .").
3.

The Fee Agreement Does Not Violate the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct.

As discussed above, the reasons the Fee Agreement was reasonable from Bums'
perspective are set forth in SOF ,r 2. But there are equally valid reasons the Fee Agreement does
not provide for an unreasonable fee from the perspective of Bums' lawyers, Parsons Behle.
When the Fee Agreement was executed in July 2018, which was shortly after trial and
before the district court issued its findings and conclusions in October 2018, Bums was seeking

2

See S.L. 1983, ch. 119, at§§ 2 and 28-49-106.
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an award in excess of $8 million in reliance damages and prejudgment interest, with additional
prejudgment interest to accrue through the entry of judgment and post-judgment interest then to
accrue through payment.

As a result, a "reasonable" contingency fee of one-third of the

recovery, which Teton County acknowledges Idaho law would allow, could yield Parsons Behle
nearly $3 million, or almost triple the amount of attorney fees Bums requested in its initial
($1,071,753.73) and supplemental ($88,603.50) fee applications. See SOF ,r,r 1 and 4. For this
reason, Bums preferred the modified contingency-fee terms in the Fee Agreement to paying
Parsons Behle one-third of the recovery obtained from Teton County.
Parsons Behle was willing to accommodate Bums' preference based on the following
economic considerations.
Because Parsons Behle might recover none of the attorney fees it had billed that were
converted to a contingency fee, it had to recover not less than double the amount of the converted
fees in order to justify the risk of not collecting any of the fees it had billed. But in addition to
assuming a "double or nothing" proposition, Parsons Behle had to factor in the economics of
likely waiting for years to recover anything at all from Teton County. The validity of this
consideration is illustrated by the fact that this lawsuit will have been pending for seven years
come May 21, that this appeal is the third appeal in this civil action and both the pending appeal
in Supreme Court Docket No. 46827-2019 and in this appeal may well result in remands to the
district court and yet additional appeals, and that the Fee Agreement has been in place since July
2018 and Parsons Behle has yet to see a dime of its converted fees and may not for years into the
future. As a result of these considerations, a reasonable contingency fee had to be substantially
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more than 200% of the converted legal fees, with Bums and Parsons Behle agreeing through
negotiation upon 300% to address the likelihood of a prolonged delay in any payment to Parsons
Behle. As quoted above, the district court found this 300% term not to be "unreasonable in light
of the nature and duration of the litigation in this case." SOFi-f 17.
Teton county acknowledges that I.R.P.C. 1.8(i) allows a lawyer to obtain an interest in a
client's cause of action to secure an attorney lien authorized by law and through contracting for a
reasonable contingent fee. The district court's finding that the Fee Agreement was reasonable
when entered into is supported by the record and reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.
H20 Environmental, supra. Accordingly, absent this Court's determination that the district court

abused its discretion in finding the Fee Agreement to be reasonable, both the Fee Agreement and
3

Idaho Code Section 3-205 establish Parsons Behle's lien on Bums' cause of action against
Teton County to be sanctioned by I.R.P.C. 1.8(i).

3

Idaho Code Section 3-205 provides, in its entirety, as follows:

Attorneys' fees-Lien. The measure and mode of compensation of
attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the
parties, which is not restrained by law. From the commencement of an action, or
the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a
party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches
to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds
thereof in whosoever hands they may come; and can not be affected by any
settlement between the parties before or after judgment.
See also Miller v. Monroe, 50 Idaho 726, 729, 300 P. 362, 363 (1931 ); Merchants' Protective
Ass'n v. Jacobsen, 22 Idaho 636, 641-42, 127 P. 315, 317-18 (1912).
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4.

The Fee Agreement Does Not Supersede Statutory Interest on Judgments.

Finally, Teton County argues that Bums "should not be able to continue to collect interest
at the rate set forth in their engagement agreement where post-judgment interest is limited by law
under Idaho Code § 28-22-104." Appellant's Brief 7. Yet for the reasons previously discussed,
although the Fee Agreement provides for the calculation and payment of the attorney fees
payable by Bums to Parsons Behle, it does not provide for the payment of any interest at all. In
fact, once the amount of the attorney fees payable by Teton County are finally determined, Bums
will be entitled to recover post-judgment interest on the full amount awarded under Idaho Code
Section 28-22-104. Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 886, 693 P.2d 1080, 1088 (Ct. App. 1984)
(an award of costs and attorney fees "simply bears the judgment rate of interest from its effective
date."). Accord Roesch v. Klemann, 155 Idaho 175, 179, 307 P.3d 192, 196 (2013) (quoting
Gro-Mor, Inc. v. Butts, 109 Idaho 1020, 1025, 712 P.2d 721, 726 (Ct. App. 1985)).
B.

Points And Authorities Supporting Burns' Cross-Appeal.
1.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Reducing Burns' Initial
Application for Attorney Fees by $278,576.48 Without Providing an
Adequate Supporting Rationale.

As discussed above in SOF ,r,r 26-27, the district court reduced the amount awarded for
Bums' initial fee application by $278,576.48 based solely on the court's following conclusion:
"Considering all of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, this Court finds attorney fees totaling $792,529.25
to be reasonable given the facts, circumstances, and proceedings in this case." However, there is
nothing in the record explaining the district court's evaluation of the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors
(nor, for that matter, any other factor) that supports the court's $278,576.48 reduction in the

-2421813.001 \4836-7850-0279v2

attorney fees awarded to Bums. The district court's unsupported reduction is directly in conflict
with the Supreme Court's holding in H20 Environmental.
In awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party in H20 Environmental, the magistrate
court limited the award to the amount in controversy and the district court affirmed the
magistrate court's award.

164 Idaho at 297, 429 P.3d at 185. On appeal of the award the

Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award for the following reasons:
It is undisputed that the trial court perceived that the issue
before it was one of discretion. It is also undisputed that the trial
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion. The
question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court acted
consistently with the applicable legal standards and reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. In this instance, the third prong
of the abuse of discretion inquiry is closely related to the forth
prong because the applicable legal standard compels the trial court
to award a reasonable attorney fee after considering the Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) factors. Stated differently, the
applicable overarching legal standard here is one of
reasonableness. Consequently, we focus our analysis on the
interrelated third and fourth prongs of the abuse of discretion
mqmry.

***
Here, there is nothing in the record which explains the
relationship between the magistrate court's evaluation of the Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) factors and its decision regarding
the amount to award for attorney's fees. It is not enough for a trial
court to acknowledge the existence of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors;
rather, it must appear that there is a reasoned application of those
factors in the trial court's decision regarding the amount of
attorney's fees to be awarded. Stated differently, in the absence of
a clear explanation from the trial court, we will find an abuse of
discretion when a trial court acknowledges the governing legal
standard and arrives at a decision that appears to be incongruent
with the application of that standard.
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Id. at 300, 429 P.3d at 188 (underscoring added). Accord Action Collection Servs. Inc. v. Black,

No. 46116, 2019 WL 2323740, at *5 (Idaho Ct. App. May 31, 2019) (quoting H20
.

Envzronmental).

4

See also Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 433, 196 P.3d 341, 351

(2008) (remanding on the issue of attorney fees because "the district court seems to pull the
award of attorney's fees out of thin air.").
Accordingly, because there is not a clear explanation by the district court of the factors it
relied upon in reducing Bums' attorney fees in the Initial Award, the district court abused its
discretion in reducing Bums' award by $278,576.48, in contravention of the holding in H20
Environmental. See also Irwin Rogers Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Murphy, 122 Idaho 270, 276-77, 833

P.2d 128, 134-35 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that "unless a 'prevailing party' is determined to have
prevailed only in part, that party is entitled to its full reasonable attorney fee."). Accord Portfolio
Recovery Assocs., LLC, v. Ruiz, No. 42982, 2015 WL 6441722, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 23,

2015) (quoting Irwin Rogers).
2.

5

The District Court Also Abused Its Discretion in Reducing Burns'
Supplemental Application for $72,349.00 in Additional Contingency Fees
Burns Owes Its Attorneys Without Providing an Adequate Supporting
Rationale.

As discussed above in SOF ,r,r 28-30, after reaffirming and adopting its analysis in the
Initial Award of the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors, the district court reduced the amount awarded for
4

The cited opinion of the Court of Appeals is unpublished and thus not precedent. The
opinion is cited solely for the reason of establishing that the Court of Appeals has recently
followed the published authority quoted in its cited opinion.
5

See supra note 4, which applies equally to the unpublished opinion of the Court of
Appeals in Portfolio Recovery.
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Bums' supplemental fee application by all of the additional contingency fees Bums owes its
attorneys out of the amount recovered from Teton County. There is again, however, nothing in
the record supporting the district court's $72,349.00 reduction in the supplemental attorney fees
awarded to Bums.
Based on the same authorities cited and quoted in the immediately prior part of this brief,
the district court therefore abused its discretion in reducing Bums' attorney fees in the
Supplemental Award by the $72,349.00 in additional contingency fees Bums owes its attorneys,

because the district court failed to provide a clear explanation of the factors it relied upon in
making the reduction.
As the Supreme Court explained in H20 Environmental:
Upon determination that a trial court has abused its
discretion, "the appellate remedy ordinarily is not to usurp the
judge's authority by exercising such discretion ourselves." Evans
v. Sawtooth Partners, 111 Idaho 381, 387, 723 P.2d 925, 931 (Ct.
App. 1986). Rather, the appropriate remedy "is to remand the case
for reconsideration in light of the correct legal standard." Id.
164 Idaho at 300, 429 P .3d at 188. Bums therefore respectfully requests this Court to remand the
awards of attorney fees made in both the Initial Award and the Supplemental Award with
instructions to the district court to determine an appropriate award of attorney fees to Bums
based on a reasoned application of the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors.

6

6

Notwithstanding remand being the ordinary appellate remedy, Bums respectfully
submits that in light of the district court's previous findings discussed in SOF ,r,r 13-24 and ,r 28,
the district court's reductions of $278,576.48 and $72,349.00 should be reinstated and awarded
to Bums as a matter of law. See especially SOF ,r 24, where the district court established it did
"not find any other particular factor relevant to consideration of fees in this case."
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C.

Burns Is Entitled To Its Reasonable Attorney Fees Incurred On Appeal.

The district court held that Bums prevailed in this civil action. SOF ,r 10. In this regard,
Paragraph 12.e of the Agreement provides: "If any party shall bring suit against the other party to
enforce this agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and
costs." SOF ,r 10; Complaint Ex. 1 at 6 [R, p. 42]. Accordingly, Bums should be awarded the
attorney fees it incurred in this appeal in accordance with I.A.R. 41 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) ("In
any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or
contract."). Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737,751,215 P.3d
457, 471 (2009) (awarding attorney fees on appeal pursuant to contractual provisions and
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l)).
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Bums respectfully requests this Court (a) to deny all
relief sought by Teton County in its appeal and (b) to reverse the district court's reduction of
Bums' initial application for attorney fees by $278,576.48 and reduction of Bums' supplemental
application for contingency fees by $72,349.00, together with both remanding the case back to
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion and awarding Bums
its reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.
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DATED this 23rd day of March 2020.
PARSONS BERLE & LATIMER

By

VI.

Isl Robert B. Burns
Robert B. Bums
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-CounterdefendantsRespondents-Cross-Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of March 2020, I caused the foregoing

RESPONDENTS' AND CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF to be served by the method
indicated below and addressed to the following:

□
□
□
□

Billie J. Siddoway
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
230 N. Main Street, Suite 125
Driggs, Idaho 83422
Facsimile: (208) 354-2994
Email: prosdocs@co.teton.id. us

~

By

Isl Robert B. Burns
Robert B. Bums
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile
Email
iCourt E-File Delivery

Robart 8. Burna

BOO West Main Street, Suite 1300
8oiso, ldnho 83702
Main 208.562.4900
Fax 208.502,4901

/\.llcrr.ey ot law

A Professlonal
law Corporallon

Dir&cl 208.562.4894
Rllurn~@parsonsbahlo.com

VIA EMAIL: kirk@bumsconcretc.com
Kirk Burns
Bums Concrete, Inc.
Burns Holdings, LLC
2385 Gallatin Avenue
P.O. Box 1864
Idaho Falls) Idaho 83403-1864

Re!

Terms of Contingent-Fee Representation by Pnrsons Bchlc & Lntimcr

Dear Kirk:
You have requested that Parsons Behle & Latimer (the "Firrn' convert its ongoing
representation of Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC Gointly 1 the 11 Burns entHies,,) in
the litigation with Teton County, Seven Judicial District Case No. CV-2013-165 (the "Lawsuit )i
to the modified contingent-fee basis described in this lett,er. Our understanding is that your
request is based on the following considerations:
1

)

11

•

Because the Burns entities owe the Finn approximately $232,500 as of June 30
for legal services relating to the Lawsuit 1 with approximately $200,000 of that
amount over 60 days out 1 the Firm is unable to continue its representation in. the
Lawsuit on the prior pay-as-you-go basis.

•

However, because the Burns entities have incurred several millions of dollars
since 2007 related to the agreement with Teton County on which the Lawsuit is
based. the Burns entities are no longer able to pay the Firm on a reasonably
current basis for the legal fees required to prosecute the Lawsuit to judgment and
thereafter in the appeal Teton County has announced it will take following the
entry of judgment.

•

Notwithstanding the foregoing) the Burns entities desire to retain the ability to pay
on a reasonably current basis as much of the Firm's legal fees as they can afford
to pay from time to time, in order to minimize the amount of the fees that are
converted to a contingent-fee basis.

EXHIBIT -~
A
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PJ\RSONSBEHLE.COM

Page 176

. ..

Kirk Burns
Julys, 2018
Page2
To address your request and the foregoing considerations. the Firm is willing to convert
~ts representation of the Burns entities in the Lawsuit to the modified contingent-fee basis
described -in Part II below. In ·this regard, however, both the Idaho Rules of :Professional
Conduct (Rule l.S(c)) and the Firm 9 s policies require that the Firm's engagement .on a
contingent-fee basis be stated in an agreement signed by the client. This letter serves that
purpose.
I.

Direction of Work

. It is my understanding that unless instructed otherwise, we will work_ directly with you
and take our instructions from you on this matter.

II ..

Agreement as to Fees and Costs

As has been done throughout the course of the Lawsuit, the Firm's work on the Lawsuit
will be billed ·at our customary rates. I will continue to be primarily responsible for this matter,
and my current billing rate is $350.00 per hour. It is the Firm's policy to use other lawye_r~ ~
staff members, including paralegals and project assistants, with lower billing rates whenever
app_ropriate in order to provide more efficient and cost..effective services to our client._. T~e rate
for the associate working with me on this matter, Christina Hardesty, is $22S.00 per hour, the
Firm•s paralegal rates range from $125.00 to $175.00 per hour, and our project assistants bill at
S90.00 per hour. Please be advised that the Firm 9s rates may be increased from .tim~to-time,
and by execution of this engagement letter, you agree to pay the inc;reased rates when adopted.
.

-~

.

It is also the Firm 1 s policy to bill our client for costs such as electronic research through
Westlaw (our online research vendor), photocopying, internal document database management
and electronic discovery services, internal messenger service, and other appropriate items, which
will be identified and charged as they are incurred. In addition, the Firm bills our client for the
actual costs incurred by the Firm for any payments we may be required to make to third parties,
including, but not limited to, delivery expenses, outside messenger fees, transportation costs,
travel related expenses, filing fees, service of process fees, expert witness or consultant fees,
outside copy charges, or electronic discovery vendor charges.
Statements for services rendered will be mailed to you monthly. You agree to carefully
read all statements and to promptly notify the Firm of any claimed errors or discrepancies jn the
billings, In the event you fail to do so it will be presumed that you agree with the correctness,
accuracy, and faimess of a statement.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, or anything in our prior engagement letter with respect to
the Lawsuit to the contrary, the F1rm's prior and future representation of the Bums entities in the
Lawsuit. including in any appeal that may be taken following the entry of judgment by the
district court, shall be on the following modified contingent-fee terms:
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1.
All fees and costs previously or subsequently billed to the Burns_ entities by the
Finn for legal services not related to the Lawsuit will be paid within 90 days from the respective
invoice dates.
2.
All costs (but not fees) previously or subsequently billed for the Lawsuit will be
paid within 60 days from the respective invoice dates, with all such costs cutTently 60 days (or
more) out being promptly paid.
3.
All future payments made by the Burns entities will be applied. by the Firm so as
to bring the outstanding balances on the various matters for which the Firm is providing legal
services into compliance with the foregoing payment protocol before any application is made to
the fees owed for the Lawsuit, with the application of all payments for fees owed for the Lawsuit
being applied to the oldest fees outstanding that have not been converted to the modified
contingent-fee basis provided in the following part 4.
All fees (but not costs) previously or subsequently billed for the Lawsuit that have
4.
not yet been or are not hereafter, as applicable, paid within 120 days from the respective invoice
dates (of which there are currently $44,297.50 in such fees) shall be converted to the fol1owing
modified contingent-fee terms:
(a)
Three times (300%) the total amount of such fees shall be payable _to the
Finn out of the first dollars collected from Teton County with respect to the Lawsuit, whether
received onjudgment entered against or upon settlement with Teton County; and
(b)
Payment of those fees not paid within 120 days from their respective
invoice dates is contingent upon the collection of money from Teton County with respect to the
Lawsuit, and none of such fees shall be payable by the Bums entities other than out of any
moneys collected from Teton County with respect to the Lawsuit.

5.
Excepting only those fees relating to the Lawsuit converted to the modified
contingent-fee term!l provided in the foregoing part 41 the Bums entities will remain personally
liable for the payment of the Firm's fees and costs previously or subsequently billed to them.
III.

Conflicts oflnterest

We have no known current conflict of interest associated with this representation. I(
however, we should determine in the future that any conflict of interest exists, it could preclude
our further representation. We would obviously do whatever we can in that event to assist you in
obtaining new counsel. If in the future you become aware of any facts that suggest a conflict of
interest existst please promptly call them to my attention.
IV.

Preservation of Documents and Information

As before, the Burns entities have a continuing obligation not to alter, destroy, dispose of,
or otherwise tamper with any evidence that may be relevant or admissible as evidence, or any
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evidence or infonnaticin that is reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence
in the Lawsuit, and to take reasonable steps to preserve and protect such evidence. This
obligation extends not only to hard copy documentation, but also to electronically stored
information, including, but not limited to, emails and attachments, computer printouts, computer
tapes, and electronic memory devices containing any documents, spreadsheets, and summaries.
In the event any emails, documents, or any other data containing information regarding the
claims and defenses in the Lawsuit reside on the hard drives of any computers owned, used,
accessed, or maintained by the Burns entities or its employees, agents, or representatives, you are
also under an obligation to collect and preserve that evidence.
V.

Communication

Correspondence, records, copies of agreements, and any other relevant documents will be
forwarded to you unless instructed otherwise. All files pertaining to the Lawsuit obtained in the
progress of this Finn's representation are open for your inspection at any reasonable time. I will
keep you informed regarding the status of this matter, but you should feel free to call me any time
with questions or concerns. Please understand. however, that we cannot and do not guarantee the
outcome of this matter, as the litigation process necessarily involves risk and uncertainty.
Your communications with the Firm are confidential and generally protected by the
attorney-client privilege, provided reasonable steps are taken to maintain the confidentiality of those
communications. However, email and text messages may not be secure forms of communication
unless encrypted or other privacy safeguards are in place. The Firm's email system is capable of
receiving and transmitting encrypted email via the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. If you
wish to communicate with the Firm via the TLS encryption protocol, please advise so that we may
ensure that the protocol is in place. Please feel free to call if you desire further infonnation on
encryption in order to make a fully infonned decision.
All paper and electronic documents, records, or files, including any emails that come into
the Firm• s possession during the course of this matter, are subject to the Firm• s document
retention and destruction policy. Accordingly, such documents, records, and files are subject to
destruction eight years after the conclusion of the matter unless (i) you request possession of
such documents, records, or files before the documents are scheduled to be destroyed or (ii) you
earlier request that such documents, records, or files be destroyed.
VI.

Confirmation of Agreement

If the foregoing accurately reflects your understanding regarding the modified
contingent-fee representation by Parsons Behle & Latimer on the Bums entities• behalf, please
print, date, and sign a copy of this letter and return the same to me by facsimile or email
transmission ·or at my address indicated above. This agreement will not take effect, and the Firm
will have no obligation to continue to provide legal services in the Lawsuit, until you return a
signed copy of this letter.
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As al~ays, please feel free to call me if you have any questions.
Very truly yours,

Ll
RBB/klc
cc:
Linda Szimhardt (via email)

/

RobertB.

The foregoing letter has been reviewed and the terms herein agreed to by me this
day of July 2018.
RECEIVED, ACCEPTED, AND AO~ED:
Burns Concrete, Inc.
Burns Holdings, LLC
By:
;;.ii ;.;::;:::
dsums, President and Member, respectively
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